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Abstract Coal bursts involve the sudden, violent ejection of coal or rock into the mine workings. They are a particular
hazard because they typically occur without warning. During the past 2 years three US coal miners were killed in two coal
bursts, following a 6-year period during which there were zero burst fatalities. This paper puts the US experience in the
context of worldwide research into coal bursts. It focuses on two major longwall mining coalfields which have struggled
with bursts for decades. The Utah experience displays many of the ‘‘classic’’ burst characteristics, including deep cover,
strong roof and floor rock, and a direct association between bursts and mining activity. In Colorado, the longwalls of the
North Fork Valley (NFV) also work at great depth, but their roof and floor strengths are moderate, and most bursts have
occurred during entry development or in headgates, bleeders, or other outby locations. The NFV bursts also are more likely
to be associated with geologic structures and large magnitude seismic events. The paper provides a detailed case history to
illustrate the experience in each of these coalfields. The paper closes with a brief discussion of how US longwalls have
managed the burst risk.
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1 Introduction
Coal bursts involve the sudden, violent ejection of coal or
rock into the mine workings (Figs. 1, 2). They are almost
always accompanied by a loud noise, like an explosion, and
ground vibration. Bursts are a particular hazard for miners
because they typically occur without warning. Despite
decades of research, the sources and mechanics of bursts
are imperfectly understood, and the means to predict and
control them remain elusive.
High stress is a universal feature of burst-prone condi-
tions. The overburden depth is responsible for the overall
level of stress, but pillar design, multiple seam interactions,
and/or mining activity can concentrate stresses in distinct
locations.
Geologic factors also contribute. The presence of strong,
massive sandstone near the seam has often been noted where
bursts have occurred (Bra¨uner 1994; Maleki 1995; Iannac-
chione and Zelanko 1995;Agapito andGoodrich 2000). In the
Utah coalfields of the western US, for example, miners refer
to ‘‘bump sandwich’’ geology where the coal seam is slotted
between massive sandstone roof and floor. In Germany, a
study that compared rock cores from 35 areas that experi-
enced bursts with cores from 400 burst-free areas found that
the burst risk was significant when there was either a 4.5-m-
thick ‘‘package’’ of strong sandstone in the first 10 m above
the mining horizon, or a 2-m-thick ‘‘package’’ within the first
4.5 m of the floor (Baltz and Hucke 2008).
Near seam geology does not wholly determine the burst
risk, however. Other geologic factors that have been
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(1) Rapid changes in the depth of cover (Holland 1958;
Maleki 1995; Maleki et al. 1999)
(2) Sandstone channels that concentrate load (Hoelle
2008; Agapito and Goodrich 2000; Maleki et al.
2011)
(3) Seam rolling and pitching (Iannacchione and
Zelanko 1995; Maleki et al. 2011)
(4) Faults (Holland 1958; Holub 1997; Agapito and
Goodrich 2000; Alber et al. 2008; Swanson et al. 2008)
As long ago as the early 1930s, coal bursts were clas-
sified into two types according to their apparent cause
(Rice 1935). ‘‘Pressure bursts’’ were thought to originate in
the seam itself and were associated with high stress and
direct mining activity. Typical pressure bursts occur while
a continuous miner is extracting a pillar or a longwall
shearer is cutting the tailgate corner of the face.
‘‘Shock bursts’’, on the other hand, were thought to be
caused by ‘‘the breaking of a thick, massive, rigid strata at a
considerable distance above the coal bed, causing a great,
hammerlike blow to be given to the immediate roof of the
mine opening, (transmitting) a shockwave to the coal pillar or
pillars’’ (Rice 1935). These events could occur on off shifts,
outby the face, in bleeder pillars, or other unexpected times
and locations. Today,we understand that the sudden, dynamic
failure in the overlying (or underlying) strata releases elastic
energy in the form of seismic waves. The failures include
sudden downward movements of the rock above the worked-
out areas, shear slip motion on faults or fractures in the
overburden, or some combination of these two mechanisms
(Pankow et al. 2008). Shear slip motion can occur on newly-
created fractures, or on reactivated pre-existing faults
(Swanson et al. 2008; Alber et al. 2008). The seismic energy
released by such events can cause damage both underground
and on the surface.
The ‘‘shock burst’’ phenomenon is well known inter-
nationally, both in hard rock mines and in burst-prone
coalfields. For several decades, the deep South African
gold mines have been aware that mining too near a fault
can trigger a major rock burst. Researchers at the Aus-
tralian Centre for Geomechanics (ACG) have developed a
quantitative rock burst risk control method that includes the
following elements (Potvin 2009):
(1) Identifying sources of seismic energy, including
faults and other geologic or mining structures
(2) Estimating the maximum likely seismic energy
release from each individual seismic source
(3) Assessing the largest potential ground motion (peak
particle velocity) in the mine as a function of the
Fig. 1 Effect of a coal burst on roadway (the top shows the roadway
before the burst, and the bottom is after the burst)
Fig. 2 Effect of a coal burst on a longwall tailgate
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magnitude of the event and the distance of the mine
workings from the event
(4) Assessing the potential damage to the mine resulting
from the ground motions, and modifying the mine
plan as necessary to control the risk
The ACG approach relies on the availability of seismic
source locations obtained from high quality, three-dimen-
sional seismic monitoring systems. Such systems have
been employed in some burst-prone European coalfields. In
Czechoslovakia, for example, researchers have been able to
study the relationship between the magnitude and location
of seismic events and the extent of damage underground. In
one instance, extensive damage resulted from a seismic
magnitude (M) event, where M = 2.8, that was located
more than 100 m away from the workings (Holub et al.
2011). On the other hand, even very large events may have
little impact on the mine if they occur well above the
workings. During one 5-year period in Poland, there were
15 large mining-induced events with M ranging from 2.2 to
4.0 (Mutke and Stec 1997). Only 6 of these had any sig-
nificant effect underground. Seam level ‘‘mining tremors’’,
on the other hand, are often too small to register on a
regional seismic network, but they can result in serious
injury if a miner is in the vicinity (Mutke and Stec 1997).
It is evident that a wide range of causes can result in coal
bursts. The volume of coal involved in bursts also covers a
wide spectrum, from a few chunks of coal up to a whole
array of pillars. The common link between all these events
appears to be the failure mechanism of the coal itself. In
general, coal is able to carry high vertical stress (or more
precisely, maximum principal stress (sigma 1)) only when
it also carries large confining stresses (or minimum prin-
cipal stress (sigma 3)). If the vertical load is increased
under these conditions, failure usually takes the form of
non-violent yielding. A coal burst, on the other hand,
apparently results when the confining stress is suddenly
reduced. Research by Babcock and Bickel (1984) indicated
that a wide variety of coals can be induced to fail violently
by this ‘‘loss of confinement’’ mechanism. The loss of
confinement can either be the result of mining activity, or
of the ground shaking that accompanies an off-seam seis-
mic energy release (a mining-induced earthquake).
One factor that does not seem to be strongly correlatedwith
bump proneness is the character of the coal. Iannacchione and
Zelanko (1995) noted that bursts have occurred in at least 25
different US coalbeds, varying from strong, blocky seams to
very friable ones like the Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4.
Extensive German laboratory studies using large-scale spec-
imens have also concluded that nearly all bituminous coals
can burst. In these experiments, coal seams ranging in
unconfined, compressive strength from 5 MPa to 50 MPa
have all been shown to be burst-prone (Bra¨uner 1994).
2 Coal bursts in the US
The long history of coal bursts in the US has been well-
documented. Iannacchione and Zelanko (1995) analyzed a
database of 172 bursts that had occurred between 1936 and
1993. These bursts had resulted in a total of 87 fatalities
and 163 injuries. Reflecting the mining technology in use
during this period, 61 % of the events occurred during
pillar recovery operations, and 25 % during longwall
mining. The remaining 14 % occurred during development.
Three main coalfields have accounted for the vast
majority of bursts. Iannacchione and Zelanko reported that
65 % of the bursts in their database occurred in the Central
Appalachian coalfields of West Virginia, Virginia, and
Kentucky. Most of the rest occurred in Colorado (17 %) or
Utah (15 %). Bursts occurred at more than 50 different
mines during this period. Iannacchione and Zelanko found
that nearly all bursts occurred at depths greater than 300 m,
and most were greater than 400 m.
A database of coal bursts that occurred during the period
1994–2013 was recently developed. It includes a total of
140 events that were reported to MSHA.1 An additional 13
events involved roof ‘‘thumps’’, but since they did not
result in violent ejection of coal or rock they were not
included in the total.2
Four of the 140 events in the new database resulted in a
total of five fatalities, two on longwalls, and three during
two pillar recovery events. Note that the Crandall Canyon
mine disaster which claimed six lives is not included in the
database. That event was unique and can be best described
as a catastrophic, mine-wide, pillar system failure. The area
that collapsed at Crandall Canyon was enormous, encom-
passing 20 rows of pillars over approximately one square
kilometer. It has more in common with the massive pillar
collapses described by Mark et al. (1997) and Zipf (1992)
than with a typical coal burst.3
Figure 3 shows that since the 1980’s there has been a
generally declining trend in the number of reported bursts.
1 In the US, coal mines must report to MSHA any ‘‘coal or rock
outburst that causes withdrawal of miners or which disrupts regular
mining activity for more than 1 h’’ (Code of Federal Regulations,
Title 30, Part 50.2). However, there is no special data field which
identifies an accident report as a burst. The burst database employed
in the present study was constructed by searching MSHA accident
report narratives for terms such as ‘‘burst’’, ‘‘bump’’ and ‘‘bounce’’.
Only those incidents where the narrative clearly indicated that a burst
had occurred were retained in the database.
2 An example of this type of event is given by the following
narrative, which describes an event that occurred during pillar
recovery at a West Virginia mine in 1996: ‘‘Employee was helping set
timbers on pillar line when the top bumped, rolling a coal rib onto his
lower back.’’
3 The second event that occurred at Crandall Canyon and killed three
rescuers was a pillar burst, but it has also been excluded because it
occurred during the unique circumstances of a mine rescue.
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Some of this improvement can be attributed to changes in
mining methods and geologic environments. Longwall
mining has largely replaced pillar recovery in the western
US, and much less coal is being mined from the burst prone
Pocahontas coalfields of Virginia and West Virginia. On
the other hand, longwalls work deeper seams today than
they did 30 years ago, and multiple seam interactions are
much more prevalent. Therefore it seems evident that much
of the improvement must be due to the better mining
practices, some of which will be discussed further on.
Figure 4 shows that during the past 20 years Utah mines
have accounted for the largest number of bursts, followed
by Colorado. Virginia and West Virginia only recorded one
burst each, though together those two states had accounted
for 54 % of the bursts during the earlier period analyzed by
Iannacchione and Zelanko (1995). Unfortunately, in 2014 a
coal burst killed two West Virginia miners. Most coal
mining in Central Appalachia is conducted by room-and-
pillar methods, though the experience of one burst prone
longwall has been described in detail by Hoelle (2008).
Figure 5 shows that 41 % of the bursts during the past
20 years have occurred on the longwall face. Another 20 %
affected the tailgate entry at the corner of the longwall face,
and 12 % occurred during retreat mining. All of these loca-
tions are subject to very high stresses, and they are directly
affected bymining activity, and somight be considered likely
locations for bursts. On the other hand, 14 % of the bursts
occurred during entry development, and another 13 % affec-
ted pillars in the headgate, bleeder, or other outby locations.
There are also some significant regional trends. In Utah,
76 % of the total 68 events occurred on the longwall face,
and another 10 % occurred either in the longwall tailgate or
during pillar recovery. Similarly, in Central Appalachia,
81 % of the 21 reported bursts occurred on the longwall
face, tailgate, or pillar line. In Colorado, on the other hand,
nearly half of the bursts occurred during entry development
or in the headgate, bleeder, or other outby location. And
although 40 of the 46 Colorado events took place in
longwall mines, only two occurred on a longwall face.
2.1 Utah experience
The coalfields of Utah are located in the mountainous central
region of the state (Fig. 6). The minable coal seams crop out
of plateau escarpments, giving rise to rapid increases in cover
depths. Typical mining depths of 450–900 m are among the
very deepest in the US. The strata are characterized by
numerous thick and strong sandstone and siltstone beds, with
rock strengths reaching 130 MPa.
The first coal bursts were recorded in Utah almost
100 years ago. They were typically associated with pillar
recovery under deep cover. However, Peperakis (1958)
noted that severe bumps at the Sunnyside Mine in Utah had
occurred in virgin development a long distance away from
active workings, and were attributed to geologic faults.
Bursts were one reason why Sunnyside was one of the
early longwall pioneers in the US. Through a lengthy
process during which many gateroad configurations were
Fig. 3 Number of coal bursts reported to MSHA, 1983–2013
Fig. 4 Coal bursts reported to MSHA, by state, 1994–2013




trialed, Sunnyside engineers developed a two-entry, yield
pillar system that virtually eliminated pillar bursts. The
yield pillars were typically 9 m wide in 2.5–3 m thick
seams (DeMarco et al. 1995). Mining engineers also
learned to avoid ‘‘critical’’ pillars which are too large to
yield non-violently yet too small to support large abutment
loads. The width-to-height ratios of such burst-prone,
critical pillars normally exceeded 4 or 5 (DeMarco et al.
1995). Longwall face bursts continued to be a problem
however, typically once the cover depth exceeded 450 m.
Seismicity induced by mining operations in Utah has
also been extensively studied. The University of Utah
operates a regional seismic system which recorded 148
mining induced events with Local Magnitude ML[ 2.5,
including 18 with ML[ 3.0, between 1978 and 2000
(Arabasz and Pechmann 2001). Of the larger events, three
were judged to have shear–slip mechanisms, while 13 had
possible collapse-type mechanisms. Few of these large
events coincided with longwall bursts underground. The
largest mining induced event ever recorded in Utah was the
M = 4.2 shear-slip event that was located 150 m above
face of the second panel the Willow Creek mine. This
event was large enough to cause rock falls that closed a
railroad and major highway, but it resulted in only minor
damage in the vicinity of the longwall (Ellenberger and
Heasley 2000).
Case history Mine A was located in the Book Cliffs
region of central Utah (MSHA 1996). The massive
Kenilworth sandstone formation lies 6–12 m above the
seam, and the strata between it and the seam includes other
strong siltstones and sandstones with typical strengths of
about 100 MPa. Another massive sandstone, the Aberdeen,
lies directly beneath the seam. The seam dip was 6–12
degrees, so each successive panel was about 40 m deeper
than the previous one. Some mining had been conducted in
a coal seam lying approximately 85 m above Mine A, but
there were no noticeable stress transfers.
Longwall mining began in 1995. Panels were developed
225 m wide in the 3 m thick seam. A three-entry yield
pillar system, with entries on 15 by 36 m centers, separated
the first longwall panel from the second. The cover above
the tailgate of the second panel was about 480 m.
As the second panel retreated, ‘‘bounces’’ consisting of
sudden forceful vibrations became increasingly common
on the tailgate end of the panel. Five of these events
resulted in broken shearer torque shafts.
A major coal burst occurred when the panel had been
retreated 225 m. The shearer had just begun the double-cut
at the tailgate that began the return pass towards the
headgate. Approximately 30 m of the face blew out, pro-
pelling coal across the conveyor and into the shields, and
causing fatal injuries to the shearer operator. Floor, roof,
and rib damage from the burst was also visible for 45 m
along the tailgate entry. This event registered M = 2.2 on
the regional seismic network (UUUS 2014).
In the wake of this incident, the remainder of the second
panel was abandoned. A new tailgate was driven for the
third panel, leaving the remainder of the second panel as an
interpanel barrier pillar protecting the third panel tailgate
from abutment loads arising from the first panel. Subse-
quent panels were also developed with the interpanel bar-
rier design, leaving solid pillars up to 180 m wide between
adjoining panels. Two independent sets of two-entry yield
pillar gates were driven for each new panel.
Almost 10 years after the first fatal burst, the seventh
longwall panel was being retreated at Mine A under almost
840 m of cover (MSHA 2006). Bounces were common
along the longwall face, ranging from thumps in the roof or
floor to coal being blown from the face. These events
occurred all along the longwall face, but were most com-
mon near the headgate and tailgate entries. ‘‘Bounce pro-
cedures’’ were in place to protect the workers by limiting
access to the face when the shearer was near the gate
entries and specifying that shearer operators should posi-
tion themselves behind the 8 m long deflector shields
mounted above the shearer. The deflector shields were
hinged off the shearer frame to be lowered or raised to
accommodate mining clearance. In addition, expanded
metal guards were attached to the armored face conveyor
periodically along the walkway, and sheets of conveyor
belting were suspended from the bottom of shield canopies
along the walkway.
Despite these precautions, a fatal bounce killed a shearer
operator located approximately 15 m from the headgate
corner as the shearer was double-cutting towards the
headgate (Fig. 7). The burst extended approximately 15 m
along the face, with the largest cavity about 1 m deep
directly in front of the victim. This event measured
Fig. 6 Mountainous terrain in the Utah coalfields. Note the thick,
cliff-forming sandstone units
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M = 1.2 on the seismic network. Mine A closed not long
afterward, because the burst hazard could not be effectively
managed at the even greater depths above the remaining
reserves.
The experience at Mine A demonstrated both the
advantages and limitations of the two Utah longwall pillar
design techniques. While the yield pillar system used on
the first two panels typically performs well at depths up
600 m or so, it concentrates the load on the tailgate corner
of the longwall face, and this can make it unworkable at
greater depths. After the interpanel barrier method was
introduced at Mine A, it was adopted at several other Utah
longwalls (Gilbride and Hardy 2004). In some cases, rather
than leave a full barrier, these mines elected to make mid-
panel moves around the area of deepest cover, thus
providing a local interpanel barrier for the next panel
(Maleki 2006).
The interpanel barrier effectively protects the tailgate
corner from the influence of previous panels, but at greater
depths the single-panel stresses on the longwall face reach
the same levels as were present with abutment loads and
yield pillars. This limitation led one major Utah operator to
announce in 2008 that it would write off reserves at depths
exceeding 900 m as unmineable (Foy 2008).
2.2 Colorado experience
While coal bursts have occurred in several different coal-
fields in central and western Colorado, in recent years the
problems have focused on operations in the North Fork
Valley (NFV) of the Gunnison River. The NFV is an area
of extremely mountainous topography where drift mines
can encounter depths of cover that exceed 600 m. Past
mining also gives rise to multiple seam interactions in
some areas.
The geology of the NFV differs from Utah in that the
immediate roof of the most common mining horizons is of
weak to moderate strength. Usually composed of interbed-
ded siltstone, fossiliferous shale, and thin layers of sand-
stone, Coal Mine Roof Rating (CMRR) values typically
range between 40 and 60, with typical UCS values of
50–80 MPa (Maleki et al. 2006; Stewart et al. 2006). The
immediate floor usually contains a considerable thickness of
coal. Massive sandstone units, with strengths exceeding
100 MPa, are typically found about 15 m beneath the
mineable seams (Maleki et al. 2009). Faulting and joint
zones are present throughout the coalfield, and active
tectonism continues to occur in the region today (Swanson
et al. 2008).
Case history Mine B began longwall mining in 2002
(Mark et al. 2012). In 2004, a series of three bursts
occurred in the tailgate of the active longwall face as it was
passing over underlying works at greater than 450 m of
overburden. A fourth event occurred the following year in
the adjacent panel tailgate in the absence of underlying
workings. A fifth burst occurred 3 years later beneath some
of the deepest overburden encountered up to that time
(540 m). No multiple seam interaction was present in this
instance. The pillars in this district were developed on 33
by 60 m centers, and maintained Analysis of Longwall
Pillar Stability (ALPS) stability factor (SF) of less than 0.6.
Late in 2009, the mine began longwalling in a new
district, with depths of cover that consistently exceeded
600 m. The pillars were significantly larger than any that
had been used at the mine in the past, with three entries
driven on 57 m centers, and they maintained an ALPS SF
of 1.12 (bleeder loading) even at a depth of 680 m. The
first panel (panel D-1 in Fig. 8) was extracted without
serious incident, but, midway through the D-2 panel in
2011, a powerful burst that registered M = 3.1 caused
extensive pillar failure and floor heave over a 3 ha area of
Fig. 7 Sketch of the second burst accident scene at Utah Mine A
(MSHA 2006)
Fig. 8 Map of Colorado Case History Mine B, showing the locations
of the bursts discussed in the texts (red stars)
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tailgate pillars. Ventilation was also severely affected, and
the panel was abandoned.
The burst in the D-1 tailgate was centered at least 150 m
outby the tailgate corner, so it is unlikely that front abut-
ment stresses were a significant contributing factor. The
burst did occur within the linear projection of a densely
jointed and slickensided joint zone that had been identified
in the mains more than 1000 m away several years before.
It was one of a series of joint zones that were arrayed with
roughly constant spacing across the mine reserve,
exhibiting an approximate N 70E trend.
Another of these other structural features was associated
with a burst that resulted in an injury during the develop-
ment of the headgate for the D-3 panel. This feature was
cause for concern because it crossed the tailgate of the D-3
panel at about mid-panel. When another large tailgate burst
occurred during the mining of the D-3 panel, however, it
was well in by this zone. While not as destructive as the
burst that occurred on the D-2 panel, it destroyed 1.6 ha of
tailgate pillars and again forced the abandonment of the
panel. This event was recorded as M = 3.2.
A new gateroad was developed in order to leave an
additional 75 m interpanel barrier to isolate the D-4 panel
from the D-3 panel. Mining had advanced approximately
400 m in the D-4 panel, and the face was beneath almost
800 m of cover, when the largest burst yet, with M = 3.4,
destroyed 4 ha of headgate pillars in by the face. Venti-
lation was again severely affected. Several weeks later,
before the face could be recovered, a heating event
developed in the gob. Ultimately the face was abandoned
and the mine was sealed.
Case history Mine B illustrates some of the typical key
characteristics of NFV bursts, which make the area some-
what unique among burst-prone coalfields around the world:
(1) The immediate roof andfloor seldomconsists of strong,
massive rock, but typically consists of relatively thin
beds of moderate strength or even weak material.
(2) While the incidence of bursts clearly increases with
depth, with almost all occurring at depths greater
than 450 m, often the bursts do not occur beneath the
maximum cover in an area.
(3) Most bursts are apparently not directly triggered by
coal-cutting activities, and many occur in areas of
lower mining stress such as headgates or develop-
ment sections.
(4) In many cases, the pillar designs were sufficiently
robust that they would have been expected to
provide adequate support to the overburden.
(5) The bursts often have a greater effect on the floor
than they do the pillar ribs.
(6) The bursts are often associated with known geologic
structures, particularly low-angle faults and zones of
high-density jointing that exhibit little to no
displacement.
(7) The bursts are often associated with large seismic
events.
Taken together, these characteristics imply that the most
significant bursts in the NFV are largely of what Rice
(1935) would have called the ‘‘shock bump’’ variety. In
other words, they appear to be driven by large seismic
energy releases occurring at some distance from the coal
seam, often apparently from the massive sandstones below.
3 Management of coal bursts
Managing the risk of coal bursts begins with an evaluation
of the factors that increase the likelihood of bursts. These
include the depth of cover, the presence of past mining
above or below, the roof and floor geology, and the pres-
ence of faults and other geologic factors. A past history of
bursts is one of the most powerful indicators of burst risk
during any type of mining. Major bursts have often been
preceded by smaller ones. Often these ‘‘precursors’’ have
occurred at the same stage in the mining process as the
subsequent large event (for example, in the same location
on the longwall face). Also, once a mine has experienced
bursts, later situations with similar geology and mining
methods should also be considered high risk.
Once zones at elevated risk of bursts are identified, the
next step is to determine appropriate control techniques to
employ within each one. According to risk management
principles, the most effective way to reduce a risk is to
eliminate it entirely (Iannacchione et al. 2008). In the
context of burst control, this would be achieved by not
mining at all in the areas of greatest risk.
Where the risk is not great enough to indicate complete
avoidance, mining may be limited to development only. For
example, in a mountainous area, the main entries might be
developed beneath the ridgeline where the cover is deepest.
Pillar design is the primary engineering control for min-
imizing the risks of pillar failure and coal bursts during
retreat mining under deep cover. In longwall mines, three
types of pillar design have been used to reduce the risk of coal
bursts (Fig. 9). Operational techniques used by longwall
mines to reduce the burst risk include reducing the depth of
the web, reducing the the speed of the shearer, uni-direc-
tional cutting, and/or avoiding double cuts at the gate ends.
Administrative controls can be used to limit the expo-
sure of miners to the areas of highest burst risk (Varley and
Whyatt 2008). They can include:
(1) Allowing only the minimum number of persons
required to extract the coal into the areas where coal
is being mined.
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(2) Positioning remote-control equipment operators as
far from the active mining as practical (depending on
radio signal range and visibility constraints).
Physical barriers can be used to protect miners from the
full force of a burst event. They can be helpful against
small bursts, but are likely incapable of absorbing the
energy from the largest events. Examples of physical bar-
riers that have been used on longwalls include conveyor
belting secured between the shields and the face conveyor,
and metal plate burst protectors installed on shearing
machines. Miners can also be provided with personal
protective equipment (PPE), such as helmets, face shields,
or body armor, though such devices can only protect
miners from small events.
The value of administrative controls, physical barriers,
and PPE is also compromised if they are not correctly and
consistently employed. Therefore, such techniques require
worker training and constant management attention.
Destressing techniques, including drilling, water infu-
sion, hydrofracturing, and blasting, have occasionally been
used to reduce the burst risk (Varley and Whyatt 2008;
Maleki et al. 2011). While some of these techniques are
used routinely in German mines (Baltz and Hucke 2008),
their performance in the US has been mixed. The diffi-
culties of identifying optimum distressing times and ability
to assess the effectiveness of each destressing attempt, the
limited time available for face destressing (to avoid pro-
duction delays) and adverse drilling conditions reduced the
overall success of the efforts. Hydrofracturing is perhaps
the most promising technique for modern high-production
longwalls (Hoelle 2008).
Underground observations and monitoring are critical
components of a burst risk management program. Mining
crews should be trained to observe coal burst warning
signs, particularly the occurrence of small bursts, which are
often the best indication that an area is becoming more
burst prone. A record-keeping system should be main-
tained, and management processes developed to ensure that
warning signs receive appropriate responses.
4 Conclusions
Coal bursts remain a significant hazard for miners in the
US and around the world. While coal bursts cannot be
predicted in advance, the risk can be estimated through
careful evaluation of those factors known to be associated
with coal bursts. Understanding the different characteristics
of coal bursts in specific coalfields is also critical to the risk
evaluation.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Agapito JFT, Goodrich RR (2000) Five stress factors conducive to
bursts in Utah, USA, coal mines. In: Proceedings of the 19th
international conference on ground control in mining. West
Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, pp 93–100
Alber M, Fritschen R, Bichofff M, Meier T (2008) Rock mechanical
investigations of seismic events in a deep longwall coal mine. Int
J Rock Mech Min Sci 46(2):408–420
Fig. 9 Longwall pillar configurations used in the US to control coal
bursts. a ‘‘Conventional’’ four-entry design using a large abutment
pillar flanked by two smaller pillars; b a two-entry yield pillar design;
c an inter-panel barrier design
8 C. Mark
123
Arabasz WJ, Pechmann JC (2001) Seismic characterization of coal-
mining seismicity in Utah for CTBT monitoring: report to
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, LLNL Research
Agreement No. B344836, variously paginated, 3 appendices.
http://www.seis.utah.edu/Reports/llnl2001/index.shtml
Babcock CO, Bickel DL (1984) Constraint: the missing variable in
the coal burst problem. In: Proceedings of the 25th U.S.
symposium on rock mechanics, Evanston, IL, pp 639–647
Baltz R, Hucke A (2008) Rockburst prevention in the German coal
industry. In: Proceedings of the 27th international conference on
ground control in mining. West Virginia University, Morgan-
town, WV, pp 46–50
Bra¨uner G (1994) Rockbursts in coal mines and their prevention.
Taylor & Francis, New York, p 152
DeMarco MJ, Koehler JR, Maleki H (1995) Gate road design
considerations for mitigation of coal bumps in western U.S.
longwall operations. In: Maleki H, Wopat PF, Repsher RC,
Tuchman RJ (eds) Proceedings: mechanics and mitigation of
violent failure in coal and hard-rock mines. U.S. Department of
the Interior, Bureau of Mines, SP 01-95, Spokane, WA,
pp 141–165. NTIS No. PB95211967
Ellenberger JL, Heasley KA (2000) Coal mine seismicity and bursts:
historical case studies and current field activity. In: Proceedings
of the 19th international conference on ground control in mining.
West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, pp 112–120
Foy P (2008) Utah’s deep coal operators face heavy regulation.
Associated Press news item, 28 June
Gilbride LJ, Hardy MP (2004) Interpanel barriers for deep western
U.S. Longwall mining. In: Proceedings of the 23rd international
conference on ground control in mining. West Virginia Univer-
sity, Morgantown, WV, pp 35-41
Hoelle J (2008) Coal bumps in an Eastern Kentucky coal mine 1989
to 1997. In: Proceedings of the 27th international conference on
ground control in mining. West Virginia University, Morgan-
town, WV, pp 14–19
Holland CT (1958) Cause and occurrence of coal mine bumps. Min
Eng, 994–1004B
Holub K (1997) Predisposition to induced seismicity in some Czech
coal mines. Pure Appl Geophys 150(3–4):435–450
Holub K, Rusˇajova´ J, Holecˇko J (2011) Particle velocity generated by
the rockburst during exploitation of the longwall and its impact
on the workings. Int J Rock Mech Min Sci 48(6):942–949
Iannacchione AT, Zelanko JC (1995) Occurrence and remediation of
coal mine bursts: a historical review. US Department of the
Interior, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Special Publication 01-95,
pp 27–68
Iannacchione AT, Varley FD, Brady TM (2008) The application of
major hazard risk assessment (MHRA) to eliminate multiple
fatality occurrences in the U.S. minerals industry. U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, Pittsburgh, PA, DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No.
2009B104, IC 9508
Maleki H (1995) An analysis of violent failure in U.S. coal mines:
case studies. US Department of the Interior, U.S. Bureau of
Mines, Special Publication 01-95, pp 5–26
Maleki H (2006) Caving, seismicity, and mine design in four Utah
coal mines. In: Proceedings of the 25th international conference
on ground control in mining. West Virginia University,
Morgantown, WV, pp 268–276
Maleki H, Zahl EG, Dunford JP (1999) A hybrid statistical-analytical
method for assessing violent failure in U.S. coal mines. In: Mark
C, Heasley K, Iannacchione A, Tuchman R (eds) Proceedings of
the second international workshop on coal pillar mechanics and
design. NIOSH, Pittsburgh, pp 139–144
Maleki H, Stewart C, Hunt G (2006) Subsidence characteristics at
Bowie Mines, Colorado. In: Proceedings of the golden rocks
2006, 41st US symposium on rock mechanics. American Rock
Mechanics Associationm, Alexandria, VA, doc ID 06–932
Maleki H, Stewart C, Stone R, Abshire J (2009) Practical application
of numerical modeling for the study of sudden floor heave failure
mechanisms. In: Proceedings of the international workshop on
numerical modeling for underground mine excavation design.
NIOSH, Pittsburgh, PA, pp 89–100
Maleki H, Rigby S, McKenzie J, Faddies T (2011) Historic mine
designs and operational practices used in deep mines for
controlling coal bumps. In: Proceedings of the 45th US rock
mechanics/geomechanics symposium. American Rock Mechan-
ics Association, Alexandria, VA, doc ID 11–276
Mark C, Chase F, Zipf RK, Jr (1997) Preventing massive pillar
collapses in coal mines. In: New technology for ground control
in retreat mining, NIOSH IC 9446, pp 35–48
Mark C, Phillipson SE, Tyrna P, Gauna M (2012) Characteristics of
coal bursts in the North Fork Valley of the Gunnison River,
Colorado. In: Proceedings of the 30th international conference
on ground control in mining. West Virginia University,
Morgantown, WV, pp 1–12
MSHA (1996) Coal mine fatal accident report, fall of face. http://
www.msha.gov/FATALS/1996/FTL96C33.HTM. Accessed 14
Nov 1996
MSHA (2006) Coal mine fatal accident report, fall of face. http://www.
msha.gov/FATALS/2006/FTL06c16.asp. Accessed 29 Jan 2006
Mutke G, Stec K (1997) Seismicity in the upper Silesian Coal Basin,
Poland: strong regional seismic events. Geophys J Int
168(2):757–768
Pankow K, McCarter M C, Arabasz W, Burlacu R (2008) Coal
mining seismicity in Utah—improving spatial resolution using
double-difference relocations. In: Proceedings of the 27th
international conference on ground control in mining. West
Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, pp 91–97
Peperakis J (1958) Mountain bumps at the Sunnyside mines. Min Eng
211:982–986
Potvin Y (2009) Strategies and tactics to control seismic risks in
mines. J S Afr Inst Min Metall 109(3):177–186
Rice GS (1935). Bumps in coal mine of the Cumberland Field,
Kentucky and Virginia: causes and remedy. US Bureau of Mines
RI 3267
Stewart C, Hunt G, Mark C (2006) Geology, ground control and mine
planning at Bowie Resources, Paonia, CO. In: Proceedings of the
25th international conference on ground control in mining. West
Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, pp 284–290
Swanson P, Stewart C, Koontz W (2008) Monitoring coal mine
seismicity with an automated wireless digital strong-motion
network. In: Proceedings of the 27th international conference on
ground control in mining. West Virginia University, Morgan-
town, WV, pp 79–86
UUUS (2014) Catalog of coal bursts in Utah, 1981–2013. http://www.
seis.utah.edu/EQCENTER/LISTINGS/Catalogs/UT_81.csv
Varley F, Whyatt JK (2008) Work practices to manage bump prone
ground. In: Peng SS, Tadolini SC, Mark C, Finfinger GL,
Heasley KA, Khair AW, Luo Y (eds) Proceedings of the 27th
international conference on ground control in mining. West
Virginia University, Morgantown, pp 20–28
Zipf RK (1992) Analysis of stable and unstable pillar failure using a
local mine stiffness method. In: Iannacchione A, Mark C,
Repsher RC, Tuchman R, Jones CC (eds) Proceedings of the first
international workshop on coal pillar mechanics and design.
USBM IC 9325, Pittsburgh, PA, pp 128–143
Coal bursts in the deep longwall mines of the United States 9
123
